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It is often argued that corporations are too focused on the short term 
(i.e., they are “short-termist”). For example, during the 2016 U.S. 
presidential campaign, candidate Hillary Clinton urged companies to 
escape the tyranny of short-termism.1 Similarly, in the recent policy debate 
in the United Kingdom on the need to reform corporate governance and 
executive compensation, Bank of England’s Chief Economist Andy 
Haldane stated that “[e]xecutive pay is a matter of profound and legitimate 
public interest. Pay practices can encourage short-term behaviour in ways 
which harm both firms and the economy.”2 
In this context, a recent article by Flammer and Bansal (FB) 
published in the Strategic Management Journal argues that long-term 
executive compensation can help mitigate short-termism.3 More precisely, 
FB show that the (quasi-random) adoption of long-term executive 
compensation leads to an increase in firm value, an increase in long-term 
profits, and is conducive to long-term investments such as investments in 
innovation and stakeholder relationships. In this Article, I briefly review 
the core arguments and main results of FB. 
I. A “TIME-BASED” AGENCY CONFLICT 
In the economics literature, the relationship between shareholders 
and managers is often conceptualized as a principal–agent relationship, 
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where the principal (the shareholders) hires the agent (the management) 
such that the agent will act in the principal’s best interest. However, if the 
agent’s preferences are misaligned with those of the principal, the agent 
can take actions that are not in the principal’s best interest—that is, in the 
context of corporations, managers can take actions that hurt shareholders 
and reduce the value of the firm. Such agency conflicts come in many 
flavors. For example, in Jensen’s model, managers have preferences for 
“empire building”—i.e., managers derive utility from being in charge of a 
large empire—and hence tend to engage in value-destroying acquisitions.4 
Other traditional agency conflicts include, for example, managers’ 
preferences for shirking5 or managers’ tendencies to engage in too little 
risk-taking.6 In all these models, managers act in a way that is not in the 
shareholders’ best interests, which in turn decreases the value of the firm. 
FB propose a new form of agency conflict, which they coin a “‘time-
based’ agency conflict.”7 This “time-based” agency conflict arises if 
managers’ time preferences are misaligned with those of the shareholders. 
FB argue that managers are likely to be more myopic compared to 
shareholders. In particular, career concerns, short-term compensation, and 
pressure to meet analysts’ earnings forecasts are all considerations that 
may induce managers to invest in (inferior) short-term projects at the 
expense of (superior) long-term projects, thus hurting the value of the 
firm.8 
To the extent that FB’s “time-based” agency conflict has bearing in 
the data, one would expect the provision of long-term incentives—such as 
the use of long-term executive compensation—to alleviate managers’ 
tendencies to overinvest in short-term projects and ultimately increase 
firm value. 
II. THE CAUSAL IMPACT OF LONG-TERM EXECUTIVE 
COMPENSATION 
There are three main tools of long-term compensation: 1) restricted 
stocks (i.e., stocks that cannot be sold in the short run), 2) restricted stock 
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options (i.e., stock options that cannot be sold or exercised in the short 
run), and 3) the so-called long-term incentive plans (LTIP). In practice, 
LTIPs are implemented in a variety of ways, but typically feature the 
award of stocks or options contingent on the achievement of some pre-
established, long-term targets. 
To examine whether the provision of long-term compensation is 
value-enhancing, one approach would be to regress firm value (e.g., 
Tobin’s Q) on long-term compensation (e.g., the ratio of long-term to total 
compensation).9 However, as FB emphasize, such a regression might be 
misleading given the potential endogeneity of long-term compensation 
with respect to firm value.10 In other words, unobservable characteristics 
may drive a spurious relationship between the two. For example, it could 
be that companies with better long-term prospects are both (1) more 
valuable and (2) more inclined to reward their management through long-
term compensation. In this case, one would observe a positive correlation 
between firm value and long-term compensation, yet it would not be 
indicative of a causal impact of long-term compensation on firm value. 
Admittedly, it is difficult to establish causality. In the ideal 
experiment, one would randomly assign long-term compensation to some 
companies and short-term compensation to others—similar to the 
approach used in randomized controlled trials. One would then compare 
the differential in firm value between the two groups. Naturally, such an 
experiment is difficult to conduct in the real world. Instead, FB use an 
empirical setup that is very close in spirit to this ideal experiment.11 
Specifically, they focus on shareholder proposals advocating the use of 
long-term executive compensation that pass or fail by a small margin of 
votes. Intuitively, whether a proposal passes with 50.1% of the votes or is 
rejected with 49.9% of the votes is as good as random. Hence, such “close 
call” proposals provide (quasi-)randomized variation in the use of long-
term executive compensation. 
FB consider all shareholder proposals on long-term executive 
compensation that came to a vote between 1997 and 2012 and are 
compiled in the SharkRepellent and RiskMetrics databases.12 There are 
808 such shareholder proposals, out of which sixty-five have a vote 
outcome within ±5% of the majority threshold, and 152 have a vote 
outcome within ±10% of the majority threshold; intuitively, these 
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proposals can be seen as being “close calls.” FB then use a regression 
discontinuity design to estimate how the adoption of close call proposals 
affects several outcome variables.13 
FB’s main result is that the stock market reacts positively to the 
adoption of close call, long-term compensation proposals.14 Specifically, 
FB find that a proposal that is marginally accepted yields an abnormal 
return of 1.14% compared to a proposal that is marginally rejected; 
intuitively, shareholder value increases by 1.14%. This finding suggests 
that long-term compensation is value-enhancing and hence supports FB’s 
“time-based” agency conflict: by adopting long-term executive 
compensation—and hence by switching towards a longer-term 
orientation—companies can alleviate the misalignment of time 
preferences between managers and shareholders, which ultimately 
translates into value creation. 
FB also explore the impact of long-term executive compensation on 
operating performance.15 They examine three measures of operating 
performance: the return on assets, net profit margin, and sales growth. 
They find that all three measures increase significantly in the long run (i.e., 
as of two years after the vote). Interestingly, they find that operating 
performance decreases slightly in the short run, suggesting that the 
adoption of a longer-term orientation might require some sacrifices in the 
short run (e.g., by investing in ambitious research and development (R&D) 
projects that are costly in the short run). Nevertheless, the net effect is 
positive since value increases overall. 
FB further study the mechanism through which the adoption of long-
term executive compensation benefits shareholders. They find that long-
term compensation is conducive to long-term investments such as 
investments in innovation and stakeholder relationships.16 First, FB 
document a significant increase in R&D expenditures and the number of 
patents following the adoption of close call, long-term compensation 
proposals. What is more, FB observe an increase in the number of highly-
cited patents—i.e., not only the quantity of innovation increases but also 
the quality of innovation. Also, FB document an increase in the number of 
explorative patents (i.e., patents in fields that are “new to the firm”), 
suggesting that companies pursue riskier (and arguably more ambitious) 
innovation. Second, FB observe that companies significantly increase their 
stakeholder engagement following the adoption of close call, long-term 
compensation proposals, as measured by the Kinder, Lyndenberg, and 
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Domini (KLD) index of social performance from the KLD database. 
Among the different types of stakeholders, they find that the increase is 
especially pronounced with respect to employees and the environment. 
The result pertaining to employees is in line with previous studies showing 
that employee satisfaction is a significant driver of value creation.17  
FB’s findings that companies increase their long-term investments 
following the adoption of close call, long-term compensation proposals 
yield further support for the presence of a “time-based” agency conflict. 
To the extent that myopic managers (i.e., managers whose time horizons 
are too short-sighted compared to shareholders’ time horizons) tend to 
underinvest in valuable long-term projects, one would indeed expect a 
shift towards more long-term investments (such as innovation and 
stakeholder relationships) once managers are incentivized to adopt a 
longer-term horizon through the award of long-term compensation. 
CONCLUSION 
FB’s results indicate that long-term compensation is effective in 
mitigating managerial myopia. Their results have been highlighted in the 
recent policy debate in the United Kingdom on the need to reform 
executive pay.18 In his blog post featuring FB’s study, Alex Edmans 
highlights where FB’s study fits in the current policy debate: 
 
Executive compensation is fixed and needs reform. But, most of 
the calls for reform focus on the wrong dimensions. They focus 
on the level of pay . . . [whereas] the most important dimension is 
the horizon of pay—whether it depends on the short-term or long-
term. 
 
We certainly want executives to act in the interest of society, 
and for a more equal society. But, the way to increase equality is 
not to bring CEOs down, but to induce them to bring others up. 
Treating stakeholders (workers, customers, suppliers, the 
environment) well is costly in the short-term, but the evidence 
shows that it pays off in the long-term. So the best way to 
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encourage purposeful behavior is not to scrap equity incentives 
(thus decoupling pay from performance), but extend the horizon 
to the long-term.19  
 
While FB’s results provide a first step in understanding the benefits 
of long-term compensation and how it helps mitigate managerial myopia, 
further research is needed to fully understand the usefulness of this tool. 
In particular, more work is needed to understand the conditions under 
which long-term executive compensation is most effective and how it can 
be best integrated with other governance mechanisms (e.g., the linking of 
executive compensation to social and environmental performance 
criteria―a novel governance practice documented by Flammer, Hong, and 
Minor).20 Making ground on these questions is an exciting avenue for 
future research. 
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